In a hearing to determine whether certain evidence is admissible in court, 45th Circuit Court Judge Paul Stutesman ruled on Friday that the murder case against Wade Allen can go forward. However, because some parts of the events that led to the collection of that evidence are still constitutionally uncertain, Stutesman granted an immediate stay of any further proceedings to permit the defense attorney, David Marvin, an opportunity to apply to an appeals court.
Allen was arrested after officers from the Sturgis Police Department appeared at his home on a phoned-in tip about a dismembered body that Allen allegedly intended to dispose of stored in his home. The officers found parts of the victim, Kelly-Jien Warner-Miller, in a cooler inside Allen’s apartment. However, the sequence of events leading to the discovery of the body called into question whether the search was conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and Marvin filed a motion to suppress the evidence.
On the night of May 22, 2019, a witness identified only by his first name called police dispatch to report a call he received from Allen. In his description of the call, the witness said Allen described the circumstances in which he had previously killed Warner-Miller, dismembered her body, and placed it in the cooler. According to a recording of the witness’ 911 call, Allen said the cooler was in his apartment, and asked the witness’s assistance in disposing of the body.
The witness instead phoned police. After the witness initially provided an incorrect address, officers determined the correct location of Allen’s residence. They showed up at Allen’s apartment shortly after 11 p.m., knocked on his door, and asked if they could search the apartment. Allen initially consented to a search by a single officer but declined to permit that officer to look inside a cooler in his living room, withdrawing his consent for the search of his home at that time or shortly after.
At that point, the officer told Allen he was being detained, placing him in handcuffs in the rear of the officer’s patrol car. After a short time, Allen allegedly began having a panic attack, during which he consented to permitting the officer to go back inside the apartment and peek inside the cooler. Then-Director of Public Safety Geoffrey Smith joined the officer in the apartment, and eventually, the cooler was opened, revealing parts of the victim’s body.
A different group of officers later conducted a search with a warrant and witnessed the full contents of the cooler at that time. In order to secure the warrant, the initial officer swore an affidavit of probable cause in which he described a foul odor in the apartment. However, in recordings of conversation he had with Smith as the home visit and search were ongoing, the officer remarked on five separate occasions that he did not notice any smell beyond Allen’s own body odor. In hearings previous to Friday, the officer said he modified his observations when writing the probable cause affidavit.
Several legal rules and precedents were at issue in Stutesman’s ruling on Friday, centering on specific ways in which the Fourth Amendment can play out in a criminal investigation, as well as on interpretation of the exclusionary rule.
The exclusionary rule prevents the use at trial of any evidence collected in violation of the Constitution. Stutesman said interpretation of the rule in the U.S. Supreme Court has evolved over the years. It has been partially separated from the Fourth Amendment where justices have argued that it is designed to deter future police misconduct and is not necessarily in itself a constitutional right for defendants. Some discretion has also been delegated to the states in interpreting the rule.
Stutesman addressed the issue of what is called a “knock and talk” visit, in which police visit a home and conduct a voluntary inquiry with occupants. Such visits are permitted under “implied license,” which is the same rule that permits a delivery driver to cross private property to put a parcel on someone’s porch.
Under the Fourth Amendment, courts have ruled officers cannot conduct a “knock and talk” visit to a residence at hours during which other kinds of visitors, such as Girl Scouts or trick-or-treaters, would also be inappropriate, because implied license does not apply at all hours of day. However, certain exceptions apply in emergencies and other cases that necessitate an immediate visit. Because officers had reason to believe Allen was preparing to dispose of a murder victim’s body, they had greater flexibility, and their initial visit was therefore legal, Stutesman said.
However, because Allen withdrew consent the first time and only gave it again after he was in handcuffs, Stutesman said it was given under duress. Further, that consent did not extend to a full search of the cooler. Therefore, the initial discovery of the cooler’s contents was improper. “I don’t know where he (thought) he still had valid consent,” Stutesman said.
Stutesman also said he considered the inconsistency in the officer’s probable cause affidavit. Had the same officer attempted to apply the subsequent warrant to his previous discovery of evidence in the cooler, it would have immediately tainted the evidence. However, the other officers who showed up later and conducted a further search were acting in good faith, Stutesman said, because they believed the warrant to be valid. Case law permits evidence in a search under a faulty warrant to stand if the officers believed the warrant to be valid at the time. ‘
Other case law permits some improperly collected evidence to stand under “inevitable discovery” doctrine, which says if there is reasonable cause to believe the evidence would have been found anyway, it can still be admissible in court. Stutesman said the detailed witness phone call that initiated the visit provided for applicability of inevitable discovery.
In preparation for Friday’s ruling, which is one of few evidence suppression hearings to have ever come across his bench, Stutesman said he conducted extensive research. He consulted case law at the state and Federal levels, spoke with colleagues in other courts and consulted law professors, and thoroughly reviewed evidence in the case as well as testimony from previous hearings.
Stutesman felt the case could proceed and denied Marvin’s motion to suppress based on the emergency exception to nighttime implied consent and knock-and-talk limitations, on the good faith of the last search conducted under warrant, and on inevitable discovery doctrine. The officers’ conduct in obtaining consent to a search under duress, searching the cooler without consent, and swearing a problematic affidavit were not sufficient to prevent Stutesman from denying the motion.
However, because previous case law did not precisely mirror the circumstances of Allen’s case, Stutesman said there are still “gray areas” in interpreting the officers’ actions. Because of that, he permitted Marvin the option to “pursue interlocutory appeal if he chooses.” Marvin did not indicate whether he would pursue such an appeal during Friday’s hearing.
Dave Vago is a staff writer and columnist for Watershed Voice. A Philadelphia native with roots in Three Rivers, Vago is a planning consultant to history and community development organizations and is the former Executive Director of the Three Rivers DDA/Main Street program.
